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Summary. 
Developed from a strong philosophical tradition, phenomenological research puts human 
experience at the heart of the research process. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, in 
particular, is a methodological stance that embraces the lived and subjective views of those 
who experience a given phenomenon. This flexible and descriptive approach provides 
researchers with an opportunity to depict and situate lived experience in rich contextual 
detail, while also accounting for the meaning-making of participants. Given the importance of 
patient/client voice, and a personalised view of health, phenomenological methods such as 
IPA can contribute extensively to health research by providing rich contextual accounts of 
experience which shed light on the essences of important phenomena.  
  
Brief Encounters with Qualitative Methods in Health Research: Phenomenology and 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
1. Introduction 
Phenomenology is a research method that: 
“Emphasises inductive logic, seeks the opinions and subjective accounts and interpretations of 
participants, relies on qualitative data analysis and is not so much concerned with 
generalisations to larger populations but with contextual description and analysis.” (Gray, 2009, 
p. 28) 
Gray’s definition of phenomenology is a clear and helpful starting point in this discussion, 
but the above characterisation of phenomenology could also be applied to other interpretivist 
qualitative approaches such as ethnography (see Benkwitz, this issue), symbolic 
interactionism, and to an extent, Grounded Theory (see Earnshaw, this issue). Thus, for those 
unfamiliar with phenomenological work it may be difficult to identify and articulate what 
makes phenomenological research distinct, useful or indeed even phenomenological. 
Accordingly this paper aspires to provide practitioners with: 
1. A brief introductory account of the development of phenomenological philosophy; 
2. A description of the Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (henceforth IPA) 
method that is prevalent in health research; 
3. A short consideration of the contribution that IPA can make to the work of health 
research. 
Mindful of the challenging language often associated with phenomenology, this article will 
further endeavour to introduce and streamline key concepts and practice. The approach taken 
herein may aid practitioners’ initial appreciation of phenomenological methodology, but 
  
cannot, within the strictures of the article, fully capture the intricacies, debates, or 
controversies of this vast area. Consequently, readers are directed to key texts throughout. 
2. Philosophical underpinnings of Phenomenology 
Born out of the philosophical work of Edmund Husserl in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, phenomenology was, and continues to be, considered a human-orientated (social) 
science. Husserl sought to recognise and embrace individual lived experience as a means to 
reach a better understanding of phenomena (Cerbone, 2006). Specifically, Husserl 
(1900/1973) argued that understanding a phenomenon is achieved through rich description 
and deep reflection upon subjective experience. Husserl’s emphasis on lived experienced, and 
focus on the human within the scientific process, was in response to perceived limitations 
with the dominant positivist approach of psychology of the time (Moran, 2000). In particular, 
Husserl was frustrated by the common scientific practice of attempting to objectively study 
isolated psychological phenomenon by removing subjective experiences and views from the 
research process itself. Husserl argued that such a research approach produced cause and 
effect models that are divorced from lived experience, and do not explain or describe the 
essential and universal elements of phenomena (Husserl, 1900/1973; Husserl, 1913/1982). 
It is important to recognise that despite the emphasis on subjective experience 
described above, phenomenology is certainly interested in managing personal bias and 
presuppositions. Indeed, one of Husserl’s foremost contributions was to encourage the 
“bracketing” (identification and temporal removing) of preconceived ideas through intense 
questioning and introspections of one’s own prior experience (Cerbone, 2006). Husserl 
explicitly advocated bracketing as it encourages researchers to have an intentional focus on 
the phenomena. Specifically, Husserl suggested that philosophers and social scientists might 
be able to direct their attention (consciousness) not at the cause or effect of a phenomenon, 
  
but at describing the universal essence (structure) of the phenomenon itself. Moreover, 
Husserl suggested that, following the bracketing process, researchers should engage in 
imaginative variation which involves considering the phenomenon with and without 
structural elements. By this, Husserl emphasised focusing on the innate properties of the issue 
at hand to identify what is truly essential to the phenomenon. For example, in a study of 
nursing, what are the essential properties that embody the business of nursing as opposed to 
other acts by other medical professionals? Using the example of nursing, a simplified 
imaginative variation of the process might involve considering whether caring is actually 
essential to the act of nursing. And if so, in what way? 
Husserl also argued for the consideration and examination of essential properties 
across subjects and episodes i.e. inter-subjectivity (also a key theme in Conversation 
Analysis, see Miller, this issue). In the nursing example we are utilising, researchers should 
consider if “caring” is common to all episodes of nursing. Such questions, and the processes 
of imaginative variation and inter-subjectivity that they represent, may lead researchers 
through descriptive accounts of nursing to the essential universal structures of nursing as a 
phenomenon i.e. a return to the thing itself. Thus, the emphasis in Husserlian phenomenology 
is upon universal structures rather than the mechanical cause, consequence or description of a 
single or specific episode of a phenomenon.        
 While contemporary phenomenology, thus, builds fundamentally on the work of 
Husserl, authors such as Heidegger (1927/2005), Sartre (1943/1984), and Merleau-Ponty 
(1962/2002) have made seminal contributions to the philosophical underpinning of the 
disciplne. In general, these authors have emphasised a more existential and interpretative 
approach. Exploration of these bodies of work is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
interested readers are directed to Spiegelberg (1982) for further discussion, or Dowling 
(2007) for an article specific to health research. Similarly, Mackey (2005) provides a clear yet 
  
critical account of how nursing research has moved on from Husserlian phenomenology and 
has embraced the work of Heidegger. 
In contrast with a pure Husserlian approach, Heidegger’s interpretative 
phenomenological method focuses less on universal structures and more on the nature of 
“being.” Drawing on the nursing example above, an interpretative study of this order would 
seek not to answer what is the essential structure of nursing but may ask what it means to be a 
nurse. Heidegger (1927/2005) proposed that we need to answer more ontologically-ordered 
questions such as these. Therefore an interpretative phenomenological study should interpret, 
clarify, and reflect upon experiences within core context. Heidegger referred to the context in 
which phenomena are experienced as the “lifeworld” (also an important concept in Narrative 
Analysis, see Rowe, this issue). Mackey (2005) also calls on researchers engaged in 
interpretative phenomenological studies to not only position a subjects’ experience within 
their lifeworld, but to ensure the researchers role as interpreters within the study is also 
considered. This emphasis on the role of the researcher as a research instrument is in stark 
contrast to Husserlian phenomenology that sought to bracket the researcher’s preconceptions, 
and once again illustrates the ongoing development of phenomenological philosophy. 
Phenomenological philosophy has been a work-in-progress for over a century, and has 
inspired a range of procedures for doing phenomenological research (Giorgi, 1975; Colazzi 
1973, 1978; Van Manen, 1990). The focus of the remainder of this paper is upon one of the 
most applied variants of the tradition, and the one most prevalent in contemporary health 
research: IPA (Smith & Osborn, 2008), which “…has proven to be particularly suitable” for 
health-focused investigation (Brocki & Wearden, 2006, p. 101). Accordingly, the following 
sections will describe the key features of IPA which, of course, builds upon the previously 
discussed work of both Husserl and Heidegger. 
  
3. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. 
The principal objective of IPA is to explore how participants are making sense of their 
personal and social world. The approach is phenomenological in that it involves a detailed 
examination of personal, lived experience of a phenomenon. Rather than attempting to 
produce an objective statement on the nature of the phenomenon however, IPA prioritises the 
participant’s personal experience and personal perception of an object or event (Flowers, Hart 
& Marriott, 1999). As suggested above, researchers in the healthcare sciences have used IPA 
to explore a range of phenomena for some time. For example, in a review of the impact of the 
method in health psychology, Brocki and Wearden (2006) identified 52 articles using IPA, 
exploring a diverse range of areas and conditions including self-injury, dementia, 
dermatological issues, chlamydia, anorexia, sexual health, spirituality and bereavement and 
addiction. 
For those unfamiliar with IPA, Smith and Osborn (2008) provide a comprehensive 
description of its underpinning theoretical foundations and produce illustrative examples of 
each stage of the method. Based upon their experiences, the authors (ibid) urge researchers to 
engage with the method’s flexibly, so that it is adapted to the preferred techniques and topic 
under investigation. In this respect, IPA purports that research is a dynamic and iterative 
process within which the researcher performs an active role. Indeed, IPA’s commitment to a 
detailed but flexible exploration of the meaning participants are making of their own social 
and personal world renders it particularly pertinent for sensitive, complex, or novel research 
questions. Conversely, whilst the researcher is trying to access the personal world and 
experience of the participant, it is arguable if this can ever be directly or completely achieved. 
In addition, the challenge is further complicated by the researcher’s own conceptions that are 
required to make sense of that other personal world. Thus a dualistic interpretative process, or 
  
double-hermeneutic, takes place in IPA. Herein, the participant is trying to make sense of 
their world, and the researcher is trying to make sense of the participant trying to make sense 
of their world. Thus, the flexible and active role of the researcher brings both potential 
benefits and challenges to IPA studies. 
4. Methodological Procedures (Sampling, Bracketing, Interviewing and Writing) 
IPA is typically an idiographic mode of inquiry comprising a small sample size. The small 
sample size encourages meticulous analysis of data to elucidate the perceptions and thoughts 
of participants’ experiences of a specific phenomenon. Thus, IPA typically avoids attempts to 
make more generalised claims more consistent with a nomothetic approach. Purposive, 
homogenous sampling is therefore utilised and this differentiates IPA from other qualitative 
methodologies such as grounded theory, as the sample is selected to illuminate a particular 
question and develop a comprehensive and insightful interpretation of the data. Grounded 
theory (in its classical sense) uses theoretical sampling to continue collecting data until 
saturation is reached (see Earnshaw, this issue). Smith, Jarman, and Osborn, (1999) consider 
this a problematic concept, as the next interview always carries the potential to provide 
unique data. IPA researchers are therefore urged to acknowledge the representational limits 
of their data. Once these objectives have been reached, analysis can be considered complete 
but must, of course, be in keeping with IPA procedures. 
Reflecting the pure phenomenological roots of the approach, and considering the 
active role of the researcher, Brocki and Wearden (2006) cite several authors who explicitly 
describe undertaking a conscious process of “bracketing” to manage pre-existing assumptions 
when conducting IPA studies. This divergence between “removing” and “embracing” the role 
of the author reflects the flexibility of IPA in attempting to be both interpretative and 
phenomenological. This flexibility is, in most accounts, both the strength and weakness of 
  
IPA. Indeed, Wagstaff, et al. (2014) argues that the interpretative role of the researcher in 
IPA is at odds with classical phenomenology, and can taint studies through bias. Similarly, 
Giorgi (2010, 2011) argues that the flexible and interpretative element of IPA is incongruent 
with Husserlian pure phenomenology as a rigorous science. Therefore, Giorgi views IPA as 
more “phenomenologically-inspired” than phenomenology per se. In response, Smith (2010) 
argues that flexibility in IPA is a key tenet and strength, as it allows researchers to use their 
own experience-based interpretation to add value and clarity. He urges researchers not to 
attempt to remove their interpretations from studies, but to embrace their preconceptions 
through transparent, managed, and rigorous methods, e.g. reflexive accounts (Smith & 
Osborn, 2011). Such an approach should enable readers to “make links between the findings 
of an IPA study, their own personal and professional experience, and claims within extant 
literature” (Smith & Osborn, 2011, p. 56). Acknowledging this methodological debate, 
Brocki and Wearden (2006) argue that if studies are methodologically rigorous, transparent 
and explicit about philosophical underpinnings, then IPA studies have much value to add to 
health research. The process of conducting and analysing in depth interviews is however, key 
to this rigour.  
Smith and Osborn (2008) promulgate the use of semi-structured interviews as the 
exemplary method of collecting data due to its flexibility and potential to produce rich, 
affective perceptions1. They further recommend techniques used in the course of their own 
research and discuss how themes are established, connected, and clustered as superordinate 
concepts. These themes can then be used as the framework for analysis of the next 
participant’s data. Convergent and divergent themes can then be identified and analysed 
                                                 
1 Readers are signposted to Smith and Osborn (2008) for an illustrative account of how to conduct analysis of 
such interviews. 
  
across participants. Jarman, Smith, and Walsh (1997) contend that such themes should be 
represented clearly in the transcripts and should be selected for articulacy and immediacy, 
and not just because of prevalence. 
To aid trustworthiness in IPA studies, extracts of participants’ views may be selected 
to explicate the most accurate expression of a theme (Flowers et al 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 
2001). Osborn and Smith’s (1998) IPA of chronic lower back pain is one example that uses 
extracts to demonstrates issues which involve an analysis beyond description of any single 
episodic account, yet are simultaneously grounded in participants’ experiences. For instance, 
Osborn and Smith (ibid) illustrate the theme “comparing this self with other selves” through 
the following extract: 
Well my personality’s gone, I used to be right bubbly and lively and you know, but it’s, that’s 
gone, and even my mum says that I’ve changed, she never really says in what way, she says 
I’ve got more snappy and more nasty. You want the old Alice back but you can’t. 
The above quote has transparently phenomenological implications. Is it is rooted in an 
idiographic personal experience as lived by the participant and, in addition, the authors also 
provide the following extract which illustrates meaning-making of the participant but also (as 
evident in the italicised and bold sections which were inscribed by the authors) clearly 
depicts a double hermeneutic i.e. the authors’ interpretation of the participants experience. 
You feel like, just not particularly giving up, but you don’t feel the person that you are 
[author’s emphasis] that you’re capable of feeling or capable of doing basically. It makes you 
feel a bit down and a bit miserable (Dottie). 
Thus the theme, “comparing this self with other selves,” adds insightful phenomenological 
analysis of lower back pain, while the descriptive illustrative extracts situate the experience in 
  
the lifeworld of those who live and experience lower back pain. Such information may 
support practitioners as they encounter sufferers of this condition.      
5. Conclusion 
As illustrated above, a robust IPA holds much potential for health research. In particular, the 
emphasis on subjective lived experience will resonate with many practitioners who seek to 
provide patient-centred and patient-focused care. IPA can make an important contribution by 
describing patient experiences. This is important for practitioners as patient voice is at the 
heart of key health documents including the NHS constitution (2013), and the Keogh Report 
(2013). As a flexible and potentially rigorous method, IPA can also draw upon the expertise 
of researchers, to ensure that participants’ experiences are contextually situated and insightful 
analysis is derived. Such insights have the potential to inform and add value to the work, 
understanding, and empathy of health practitioners as they encounter patients who have 
unique and personal experiences.  
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